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Nepala b s t r a c t
Urban migration by Nepalese Dalits has not only provided them with social, economic and educational
opportunities, but also the possibility of escaping traditional caste-based discrimination. However,
despite making the most of opportunities provided by the city, Dalits have not been able to pursue their
political agenda to the extent of other ethnic communities. This study in the city of Pokhara, Nepal,
explored Dalit identity using two rounds of focus group discussions involving a total of 23 individuals
drawn from a range of Dalit caste groups with a variety of livelihoods. The results describe the caste-
based discrimination experienced by the participants and the different strategies they employ to either
reinvent themselves by changing names; or embracing their caste-heritage and taking advantage of affir-
mative action programmes. Whilst urban migration can provide some relief from discrimination, the
study reveals that caste still remains prominent in the lives of Dalits in Pokhara. The paper argues that
Dalit unity and elimination of intra-Dalit caste-based discrimination are needed in order to institution-
alise their citizenship rights in post conflict Nepal.
 2016 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an openaccess article under the CCBY license (http://
creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).1. Introduction
The promulgation of a much anticipated new constitution of
Nepal in late 2015 partially ended a prolonged political transition,
including the decade long Maoist insurgency. However, ethnicity
remains a contentious area in both politics and economic action
(Karki, 2010; Khanal et al., 2012; Lawoti and Hangen, 2013;
Adhikari and Gellner, 2016). Recent political groups, such as the
Unified Dalit, Terai and Tharu movements, which are organised
by various ethnic and regional groups including Dalits, Madheshis
(people living in the southern Terai region of Nepal bordering
India) and an indigenous group (Tharus) respectively have their
roots in the issue of ethnic identity and failure of political elites
to address it adequately. Instead of rejoicing in the new constitu-
tion, Nepal suffered from further instability due to political rallies
and politically motivated violence. Moreover, an informal eco-
nomic blockade imposed by India in 2015 in response to Madheshi
concerns in the constitution making process, placed a heavy fiscal
burden on an already fragile economy recovering from a series of
earthquakes earlier that year.
Although significant differences exist between political parties
such as the Madhesi Janadhikar Forum (MJF), Rajendra
Mahato-led Nepal Sadbhavana Party (NSP), Terai-MadheshLoktantrik Party (TMLP) and Adivasi Janajati (indigenous people),
the issue of ethnic identity brought them together for the
promotion and institutionalisation of their political, social,
religious and cultural and economic rights (Hachhethu et al.,
2008; Nayak, 2011; Lawoti and Hangen, 2013). However, despite
representing about 13.1 per cent of the Nepalese population
(CBS, 2011), Dalits have failed to unite and clearly articulate their
political agenda. Dalits continue to remain one of the most eco-
nomically marginalised, politically excluded and socio-culturally
oppressed communities in Nepal (Dahal et al., 2002; Kabeer,
2006; UNDP, 2008; Sunar, 2008). Published statistics indicate
that Dalits as a group are significantly below the national average in
most development indicators such as poverty - 48%; literacy - 40%;
chronic childhood malnutrition - 60%; food deficiency - 85%;
and life expectancy - 48 years (CBS, 2011). Furthermore, the
humiliating and degrading practice of untouchability is still
continuing despite the country being declared ‘untouchable free’
by the new constitution (Bhattachan et al., 2009; Cameron, 1998,
2009; Lamsal, 2012). This social practice ascribes a low status
to certain social groups confined to menial and despised jobs
within the Hindu caste system (Berreman, 1973) and within
which people from higher castes avoid direct physical
contact with people from lower castes and do not share food and
drink touched by them.
There are strong incentives to escape the constraints imposed
by caste and it can be a factor in rural to urban migration. Similar
to other developing countries, Nepal has significant migration from
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Woods, 2012). People migrate primarily for new economic oppor-
tunities, as cities provide jobs (Castles and Miller, 2003;
Bhattacharya, 2002; Ishtiaque and Ullah, 2013), but also for social
benefits such as provision of education and health care (Kochar,
2004; Roberts, 2001; Banerjee, 1991). A third reason for migration
is to escape discriminatory social structures prevalent in rural dis-
tricts by seeking a new identity in the relative anonymity of cities
(Adhikari and Deshingkar, 2015; Picherit, 2012; Cameron, 2007;
Folmar, 2007). This is particularly relevant in the case of Dalits as
the extent of caste-based discrimination in urban settings is less
than in rural areas (Pandey et al., 2006). Therefore, the Dalit com-
munity in Nepal is a particularly interesting case to explore migra-
tion as a way of seeking new identities.
This paper draws on a study in a small city, Pokhara, which is
about 210 km from the capital Kathmandu. It investigates the
space it provides to Dalit communities for defining and redefining
their ethnic and cultural identities, and the ways in which they
renegotiate and realign their economic activities during the cur-
rent political transition in Nepal. The paper is divided into five sec-
tions. Section 2 describes the notion of caste and provides a brief
review of the role caste and ethnicity in the recent political pro-
cesses in Nepal. Research methods and a brief introduction of
Pokhara are presented in Section 3. Section 4 presents analysis
and discussion; and conclusions are presented in Section 5.
2. Caste and politics
This study focuses on the diverse ethnic group of Dalits. Dalits
in Nepal and elsewhere have endured social segregation, discrimi-
nation and oppression, including untouchability, at the hands of
non-Dalits particularly the higher castes, Brahmins and Chhetri,
despite following the same religion and having common deities.
In the past, discrimination against Dalits was so endemic that they
were not allowed to be educated, serve in the army, denied rights
to property, had different footpaths and water wells, and were
denied entry to temples (Ahuti, 2008). Ghimire (2010) argues that
it was a common belief in the past that food and water touched by
Dalits should not be consumed by non-Dalit girls when their teeth
begin to grow and boys should do the same when they reach ritual
performing age, which is usually at very early age. Dalits have also
suffered discrimination and sub-ordination at the hands of Janajati
(indigenous people). For example, a study by Hofer (1976) investi-
gated the relationship between Bishwokarma or Kaami (DalitTable 1
Caste hierarchy proposed by the Muluki Ain (legal code) 1854 in Nepal. Source: Höfer (19
Caste group of the
‘‘Wearers of the holy cord”
(ta¯ga¯dha¯ri)
Caste group of the ‘‘Non-
enslavable Alcohol-Drinkers”
(nama¯sinya¯ matwa¯li)
Caste group of the
Alcohol-Drinkers”
matwa¯li)
Upa¯dhyaya Bra¯hmaṇ Magar Bhoṭe (‘‘Tibetanids
‘‘Tibetanoids”)
Rajput (Thakuri)
(‘‘warrior”)
Guruṅg Cepa¯ṅg
Jaisi Bra¯hmaṇ Sunuwa¯r Kuma¯l (potters)
Chetri (Kṣatri) (‘‘warrior”) Some other Newa¯r castes Ha¯yu
Dew Bha¯ju (Newa¯r
Brahmins)
Tha¯ru
Indian Brahmin Gharti (descendant
slaves)
Ascetic sects (Sannya¯si,
etc.)
‘‘Lower” Jaisi
Various other Newa¯r
castescaste) and the Tamangs (Janajati caste) in Chautara in Sindhupal-
chowk district and showed that, despite following Buddhism, Dal-
its suffered caste-based discrimination by the Tamangs. However,
even though discrimination occurs at the level of individuals,
boundaries between the castes are not clear (Mayer, 1960) and this
obscures political identity.
Caste consists of social categories that are exclusive (no one
belongs to more than one group) and exhaustive (everyone belongs
to some group), a stratification that is still prevalent in Hindu soci-
eties all over the world where individuals inherit caste from their
parents at birth (Bailey, 1963). One of the principles on which
the caste system is based is the ‘‘Hindu Pollution Concept”
(Hutton, 1946; Srinivas, 1952; Douglas, 2002; Dumont, 1970).
These divide society into four Varnas namely Brahmins, Kshatriyas,
Vaishya and Sudras. The Varna system has roots in the Dharma-
sastras (a collection of ancient Hindu religious books prescribing
moral laws and religious duties and righteous). Sudras include a
wide spectrum of groups, including near-untouchables. The tasks
assigned to the Dalits are considered to be too ritually polluting
to merit inclusion within the traditional Varna system and so the
Dalits experience social exclusion.
The ritual status is derived from the relationships of individuals
within a group or between groups, with respect to a pattern of
interactions based on religious myths, particularly interpretation
of the Rig Vedas (one of the four canonical sacred texts of Hin-
duism), which divides the Hindus into good sacredness and bad
sacredness (Srinivas, 1952; Milner, 1994). In the 14th century, King
Jayasthiti Malla stratified the society he was ruling in Kathmandu
into various castes and sub castes based on the ancient system of
Hindu Philosophy (Riccardi, 1977). The idea of reincarnation is
inherent in Hinduism. As such, Hindus believe that good sacred-
ness is a reward for people from the god who conducted them-
selves well and performed good deeds (Karma) in their previous
life and bad sacredness is a punishment given to those who failed
to conduct themselves well. It is believed that being high caste is a
reward associated with good sacredness whilst low caste is associ-
ated with bad sacredness (Srinivas, 1952). The Muluki Ain (Legal
Code) of 1854, implemented by Jung Bahadur Rana, formally lega-
lised the caste system by dividing Nepali society into a four-fold
caste hierarchy as shown in Table 1.
From a broader sociological viewpoint an equivalence can be
made between Adivasi-Janajati and other caste groups prevalent
in Nepal, including Madheshis, Brahmins, Adivasi Janajati, Dalits
and so on, as recognisable ethnic groups. However, in practice,79).
‘‘Enslavable
(ma¯sinya¯
Impure, but ‘‘touchable” castes
(pa¯ni nacalnya¯ choi chiṭo ha¯
lnunaparnya¯)
Untouchable castes (pa¯ni
nacalnya¯ choi chiṭo ha¯
lnunaparnya¯)
” and some Kasa¯i (Newa¯r butchers) Ka¯mi (blacksmiths)
Kusle (Newa¯r musicians) Sa¯rki (tanners, shoemakers)
Hindu Dhobi (Newa¯r washerman) Kaḍa¯ra¯ (stemming from
unions between Ka¯mi and
Sa¯rki)
Kulu (Newa¯r tanners) Dama¯i (tailors and
musicians)
Musulma¯n Ga¯ine (minstrels)
s of freed Mlecch (European) Ba¯di (musicians)
Poṛe (Newa¯r skinners and
fisherman)
Cya¯me (Newa¯r scavengers)
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‘indigenous’ groups in Nepal, whilst Dalits do not have an ethnic
group status. This is mainly because Dalits do not share a distinct
race, language, culture or territory. They are culturally heteroge-
neous and sparsely distributed throughout Nepal (Gellner, 2007;
Folmar, 2013). The National Dalit Commission of Nepal identified
22 separate cultural groups within the Dalits in 2003
(Bhattachan et al., 2009). In 2011 the number was increased to a
total of 29 cultural groups within Dalits (Biswokarma, 2011).
The situation is further confused in Nepal by caste and ethnicity
having been used interchangeably (Hutt, 1997; Allen, 1997),
mainly because of lack of clarity amongst academics and policy
makers alike (Gray, 2012). The distinction between caste and eth-
nicity is unclear in many spheres including government documents
such the census (CBS, 2002); the Constituent Assembly’s State
Restructuring Committee (GoN, 2011); reports by international
organisations (Bennett et al., 2008; Ghai and Cottrell, 2008;
Sharma and Sen, 2008); and academics (Bennett, 2005; Bhatt and
Mansoob, 2009; Gellner, 2005; Khanal, 2009). However, the dis-
tinction between caste and ethnicity is important, as conflation
of the two is considered a major obstacle to engaging Dalit agendas
in the political arena (Folmar, 2013). Of the many sociological dif-
ferences between caste and ethnicity, three in particular remain
critical for Dalits. Firstly, people of different ethnic background
remain more or less socially equal despite differences in culture,
traditions and class status. For example, Magars, Gurungs and
some Newars castes are all socially equal on the caste hierarchy
even though there are cultural differences between them. How-
ever, despite sharing many cultural/traditional attributes, Dalits
are vertically differentiated on the caste hierarchy with intra-
Dalit discrimination being rampant. Secondly, caste hierarchy not
only enabled, but also legitimised, economic exploitation and
political marginalisation of Dalits. In contrast, ethnic groups did
not demonstrate economic exploitation, mainly because of similar
social status (Gray, 2012). Thirdly, some ethnic groups in Nepal are
clustered in certain geographical areas such as Newars in theFig. 1. Major castes and ethnicKathmandu valley, Tharus in the west, Rais/Limbu in the east,
and Gurungs/Magars in the Gandaki valley. However, Dalits are
not concentrated in any single geographic area, but live throughout
the country as shown in Fig. 1. As such, in this paper Dalits are con-
sidered as caste groups, located at the bottom of the caste hierar-
chy, that are more or less horizontally and culturally
homogenous (in terms of the discrimination endured), but verti-
cally hierarchized (in terms of existence of intra-Dalit caste
hierarchy).
The long tradition of caste-based stratification in society has
been a major contributory factor in recent civil unrest and political
division (Sharma, 2006; Sambanis, 2001; Hironaka, 2005). Castes
have become competing socio-political groups with a hegemony
of upper castes controlling state. Governance, consolidating
political and bureaucratic power, and so further embedding the
socio-economic hierarchy (Ishii et al., 2007). This resulted in dis-
crimination contributing to the onset of a brutal civil war in Nepal
(Murshed and Gates, 2005; Do and Iyer, 2010), leading to political
fragility (Rotberg, 2003) to the extent that Nepal was often spoken
of as a failed state (Manjikian, 2008). Dalits were closely involved
with this so-called ‘Maoist People’s War’, waged by the Maoist
Communist Party against the state in Nepal between 1996 and
2006, in their struggle for political identity (Bownas, 2015). The
Maoist insurgency affected the countryside as the insurgency
was particularly severe in rural areas and had considerable support
from many socio-economically and politically disadvantaged sec-
tions of the Nepalese society, including Dalits, Adivasi and Janajati
(indigenous people) particularly from rural communities, who suf-
fered historic and institutionalised social discrimination, political
exclusion and economic deprivation (Adhikari, 2014; Kalyvas,
2006; Lawoti and Pahari, 2010; Macours, 2010).
At the end of the conflict, two rounds of elections to the Consti-
tutional Assembly and deliberations on state restructuring brought
the issue of ethnic identity to the forefront of political debates
(Karki, 2010; Khanal et al., 2012; Lawoti and Hangen, 2013). For-
mation of a Constitutional Assembly through election to write adistribution in Nepal 2011.
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demands of the Maoists. As a part of the peace building process,
Nepal held its first Constitution Assembly election in April 2008,
but this was dissolved in May 2012 without promulgating a consti-
tution. Ethnicity was a key factor preventing agreement on this
Constitutional Assembly-I. Nepal again held a second Constitu-
tional Assembly in November 2013 and ethnicity continues to be
a major issue in discussions for the Constitutional Assembly-II.
Such delays are caused not only by the polity, but also the complex
and heterogeneous composition of Nepalese Dalits, where the
social category of Dalits in Nepal is multi-layered with divisions
along the lines of religion, caste (within caste), region, class posi-
tion and situation, gender, age and language (B.K., 2007; Dahal
et al., 2002; Kharel, 2010). As such, whilst the assumption is that
there are common foundations of social categorization and identi-
fication (Turner, 1985), both similarities and differences have fea-
tured in the construction of Dalit identity in Nepal (Buckingham,
2008; Jans et al., 2012). The field study conducted in Pokhara
reported here explores aspects of this identity in an urban setting.3. Materials and methods
3.1. Study site
Present day Pokhara city covers 55.22 sq. km, of which 4.4 sq.
km is water in rivers and lakes (CBS, 2011). The population grew
from 13,000 in 1956 to 20,611 in 1971 and 36,010 in 1978
(Tadié, 2010). More recent rapid expansion has led to the popula-
tion reaching 300,000 in 2011 (CBS, 2011). The modern city has
emerged as a rapidly urbanising commercial hub known as the
‘‘tourism capital of Nepal” (Nepal et al., 2002). The city serves as
the base for world famous Annapurna Circuit trek and hundreds
of thousands of tourists visit Pokhara for pilgrimage and adventure
tourism. The service sector, including tourism and hospitality
industries, contribute 58% of Pokhara’s economy, with remittances
contributing 20% and agriculture 16% (Baniya, 2004). The increase
in population has been fuelled by an influx of internal migrants
from neighbouring towns and villages, particularly during the
Maoist insurgency. Pokhara has become a cultural confluence of
more than 80 different ethnic and caste groups (Adhikari, 2000).
The major castes living in Pokhara are Brahmins, Chhetris, Gur-
ungs, Magars and Dalits, mainly following Buddhist and Hindu reli-
gions. A small proportion of Muslims also live in the city.
Historically, whilst settlement of the surrounding mountain for-
ests of Pokhara by Tibetan-Burmese tribes (Gurung and Magar)
took place as early as the 8th and 9th century, it was not until
the mid-eighteenth century that the town of Pokhara started with
the migration of 26 Newar households from Bhaktapur (Kath-
mandu valley). The Gurungs and Magars practiced animal hus-
bandry and swidden agriculture, whereas the Newars residing in
the valley practiced agriculture, trade and crafting (Kafle, 2011)
and were attracted by the fertile agricultural land, water facilities
for irrigation and forests for wood, food and fodder (Adhikari,
2000). Impressed by their trading abilities and artisanship, the King
of Kaski Kingdom facilitated westward migration of more Newars
from Kathmandu to Pokhara (see Fig. 2).
As the kingdom gained strength Pokhara became a military cen-
tre on an established postal route called ‘‘Hulaki Marga” (Blaikie
et al., 1980, p. 124). Historians such as Regmi (1971) mentioned
that Pokhara developed as an important trading centre because
of its location as a gateway to Thak Khola where Thakali (an impor-
tant ethnic tribe of Tibetan origin) lived. The Thakalis travelled to
Pokhara to trade salt, spices and herbs. Hill ethnic groups such as
Gurungs and Magars, whose primary occupation was sheep rear-
ing, traded woollen blankets, honey, wax, ghee and oilseeds toTibet via Thak Khola in the north and to India via Butwal (Batauli)
in the south. The traders also brought sugar, tea, spices, medicine
and cotton clothes from India via Butwal to Pokhara. Pokhara
was designated the administrative headquarters of district west
No. 3 during the Rana regime, which contributed towards Pokhara
flourishing as a market place and administrative hub (Adhikari,
2002).
Although Pokhara was considered a place of importance for
trade and commerce, it was not until the political changes brought
by the fall of the autocratic Rana regime, and introduction of
democracy in 1951, that the development process accelerated. In
fact, Pokhara was not even mentioned as an urban centre in the
1952–54 census (Adhikari, 2000). The airport was built in 1958
and the first motor vehicle ran in the city only the following year.
The city gained municipality status in 1959 and was upgraded
to Town Panchayat in 1965, providing impetus for development
of transport, communication and economic activities. The Indian
government set up the Military Pension Branch of the Embassy
of India in 1996, for the payment of pension and address other wel-
fare issues of the Nepalese ex-servicemen and their families resid-
ing in Nepal. This further, attracted in-migrants to Pokhara from
other parts of the country. Hydro-power generation by the Phewa
dam provided electricity for the first time in Pokhara. Much of the
population increase and urbanisation took place when Pokhara
was connected to Kathmandu by road after completion of the
Prithvi Highway in 1974; and with India via Sunauli when the Sid-
dhartha Highway was completed in 1972. Pokhara was designated
as the Headquarters of Western Development Region in 1972 and
the city was declared a Sub Metropolitan city in 1996.
3.2. Research methods
Two focus group discussions were held in March 2014. A snow-
ball sampling method was used to recruit participants living and
working in Pokhara. Three eligibility criteria were used for recruit-
ing participants, these were: Dalit castes; age at least 18 years; and
residency, living in Pokhara either temporarily or permanently.
Table 2 presents characteristics of the participants.
Altogether 13 participants representing various Dalit castes
took part in the first round of focus group discussion, of whom nine
were male and four were female. The age range of the participants
was 19–57. Five participants belonged to the Pariyar (Damai) caste
with livelihoods being: tailoring business; tailoring; bank worker;
housewife and a local journalist. Some of the participants belong-
ing to the Pariyar caste, who were financially well off, had set up
tailoring businesses, whilst those who did not have the financial
capability worked as custom sewers in tailoring shops. Three par-
ticipants were Bishwokarma (Kaami) of whom one worked as a
goldsmith whilst the other two were a local politician and a house-
wife. Two participants belonged to Nepali (Sarki), one was a stu-
dent and the other worked as a cobbler in Pokhara. Dalit castes
such as Pariyar, Bishwokarma, Nepali and Gandharva are called
also Damai, Kaami, Sarki and Gaine respectively although the use
of such terms is not preferred by Dalit castes mainly due to stigma
attached with them. Two participants belonged to the Gandharva
(Gaine) caste of whom one was a housewife whilst the other
worked as a street singer who sang on local public buses. Only
three individuals were living permanently in Pokhara, whilst the
remaining ten were temporary residents as they did not own a
property in Pokhara were there only for work. The temporary res-
idents visited their families in their home towns or villages once
every few months especially during festivals and holidays.
The second round of focus group discussions took place in the
Dalit settlement where ten participants from Dalit castes took part,
ranging in age from 25 to 53. Seven of the participants were male
whilst the remaining three were female. The females belonged to
Fig. 2. Map of study site.
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housewives and one ran a local kirana pasal (corner shop). Of the
seven males, two were Pariyars who worked as tailors in the city,
whilst two Bishwokarma worked as wage labourers. One of the
Gandharva had a business selling Sarangi (musical instruments),
whilst one Nepali was unemployed seeking foreign employment
in the Middle East, and another was a housewife. Five participants
were permanent residents of Pokhara whilst the remaining five
were temporary residents. The higher proportion of participants
who were permanent residents of Pokhara in the second round
of focus group discussion is mainly due to location, as the focus
group discussion took place in the Dalit settlement areas.Participants whose castes were Pode and Chyame spoke both
Nepali and ethnic Newari languages, whilst the others spoke only
Nepali.
Unlike previous studies of Dalits in Pokhara (Bishwokarma,
2004; Parajuli, 2007; Chhetri, 2007), this research included a broad
mix of participants from different Dalit caste groups representing
individuals from various walks of life, including both temporary
and permanent residents. The rationale for including a mix of par-
ticipants is due to the need to have a range of views given the nat-
ure of the research question, which included concepts of urban
citizenship, political transition and state restructuring. These are
contested topics, as all ethnic groups were making claims to ensure
Table 2
Characteristics of focus group participants.
Characteristics Focus group discussion I (N) Focus group discussion II (N)
Castes
Pariyar 5 2
Bishwakarma 3 3
Nepali 2 2
Gandharva 2 2
Chyame 1 0
Pode 0 1
Gender
Male 9 7
Female 4 3
Residency
Permanent 3 5
Temporary 9 5
Total 13 10
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pensated in some way for the historical disadvantages they suf-
fered. The mix of participants also enabled a rich and in-depth
understanding of the issues through exploration of Dalit experi-
ences of living and working in Pokhara city and how urban
socio-economic factors have impacted their lives and livelihoods
(Krueger, 1988).
Focus groups are well suited to obtaining rich contextual data,
as they help to identify subjects’ concerns and stimulate fresh ideas
pertinent to research issues through debate and discussions, par-
ticularly when little is known at the outset (Hakim, 2000). The
focus group discussion was also an efficient means of determining
the language people used when thinking and talking about their
life experience as Dalits in the city and the prevailing social and
institutional settings that constrained their social-economic mobil-
ity (Krippendorff, 2004). This helped to provide concentrated
amounts of data in the participants’ own words. The participants’
interactions added richness to the data that might be missed in
individual interviews or surveys and, more importantly, provided
critical information for appreciating the social and cultural intrica-
cies of the Dalit community. Focus Group Discussions also pro-
vided an opportunity for the researchers to interact directly with
participants, facilitating discussions, probing responses, posing fol-
low up questions and clarifying any dubious and contentious
issues (Stewart et al., 2007; Foddy, 1993). Articulating opinions
and presenting their arguments on important aspects such as state
restructuring, citizenship and constitution making can be difficult
for illiterate Dalits. The focus group method helped to avoid
answers such as ‘‘I do not know what to say”. The rationale for
choosing focus group discussions was also based on the necessity
to stimulate research participants to build a clearer picture of the
political and social fabric within which the notion of citizenship
was visualised, claimed and contested.4. Analysis and discussion
4.1. Religion and culture in identity construction
Culturally, Dalits, with an exception of Newari Dalits, share
almost identical features with other Hindu in Nepal. The cultural
similarities are partly because both Dalits and non-Dalit follow
the Hindu religion and believe in common deities and re-
incarnation; and are believed to have descended from either Astric
and Dravidians or Indo-Aryans who arrived in Nepal either from
India or the Caucasus region in central Asia. The focus group partic-
ipants argued that ‘‘we are the same” as Brahmins and Chhetri, ‘‘we
have the same gods and goddess”, ‘‘we visit the same temples” and
‘‘we have common festivals”.‘‘. . .We worship the same Krishna bhagwan (Lord Krishna) in
the morning, dance to the same music in the afternoon and visit
the same temple in the evening and it’s Krishna Ashtami for
everybody and the same goes for big festivals such as
Dashain/Dashara and Tihar (Diwali). . .”
[Female, 42 years]
Sapkota (2014) contends that racial identity emanates primarily
from features that are external and visible such as skin colour e.g.
white and non-white identity, and structure of the face e.g. Aryans
and Mongol. Although much has changed, historically Europeans in
general, and the British in particular, constructed a black ethnic
group included thosewhowere ‘non-white’ such as Asians, Africans
and those of Caribbean descent (Yuen, 1997). However, whilst Dal-
its are treated like a different race from Aryans, they demonstrate
mixed facial features and many of them share a similar biological
and racial background with the higher castes of Brahmin and Chhe-
tri making them almost indistinguishable, except for caste.
Another woman, who participated in the research said:
‘‘. . .As the lady said earlier that we are the same and believe me,
we are the same but the only difference is that we do everything
as low caste Dalits, who are poor and they do it as higher caste
Brahmins/Chhetri who are richer than us. . .”
[Female, 19 years]
The differences are socially constructed with religious backing,
and this combination is translated into political and economic dis-
parities. As political awareness has increased amongst the Dalits,
the experience of such disparities has played an important role
in the construction of Dalit identity.
4.2. Social shared experience in identity construction
Dalits in Nepal, as elsewhere, particularly in the Indian sub-
continent, experience social segregation and untouchability. This
was also true amongst the participants involved in this research.
This discrimination also leads to a shared cultural and social back-
ground, which is considered fundamental in the construction and
expansion of ethnic identity (Huntington, 1996).
Caste-based discrimination experienced by the participants in
their home villages initially, and continued experience of discrim-
ination, although different and to a lesser degree in Pokhara city,
resonated profoundly in the construction of identity amongst the
participants (Turner, 1985). During the focus group discussion, a
participant, who had to sell his land in a rural village in Syangja
district and migrated to Pokhara to overcome caste-based discrim-
ination, burst into tears and shared his experience:
‘‘. . .We were discriminated against everywhere – hotels, restau-
rants, schools, temples, local well, meat shop, dairy . . . you
name it. . .even in areas for open defecation . . . we were not
allowed to defecate in areas where higher caste visited to attend
the nature’s call. . .”
[Male, 42 years]
Feelings of psychological trauma due to caste-based discrimina-
tion in their home villages was a recurring theme amongst the
participants:
‘‘. . .It’s extremely hard to survive in a murdered dignity, at
times it kills me from within. . .its unbearable. . .the sound of
very word Dalit hurts me. . ., its uncomfortable to talk, interact
with friends, and neighbours because you never know when
the humiliation is coming. . .we talk together, breathe together
but I don’t know what to say . . . at least this is less of a problem
in urban places like Pokhara although caste-based discrimina-
tion is not uncommon here too”
[Male, 42 years]
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Pokhara was also echoed by another participant of the focus group
discussion:
‘‘. . .Because I was belittled and discriminated. . .my community
could not become part of the mainstream and we were com-
pelled to live as peripheral occupants. . .we have some degree
of social integrations in the urban places like Pokhara. . .”
[Male, 36 years]
‘‘. . .At school we could not touch the water container. . . there
was a water pot full of water and mug too but I could not get
water out I had to wait until the office assistant (peon) came
so that he could give me some water from the pot. . .I used to
get so thirsty sometimes for hours . . .”
[Female, 25 years]
There is a growing body of migration literature highlighting
various reasons for migration of people from one location to
another (Sjaastad, 1962; Todaro, 1969; Bilsborrow and DeLargy,
1990; Massey, 1999; Lall et al., 2006; Matarrita-Cascante and
Stocks, 2013). Brettell and Hollifield (2000) and Priore (1979) argue
that people migrate for economic reasons such as better employ-
ment opportunities, higher income and improved lifestyle. People
also migrate from one place to another because of environmental
concerns such as human induced and natural disasters (Smith,
2007; Naudé, 2008) and environmental change (Bates, 2002;
Poston et al., 2009; Reuveny, 2007; Smith, 2007). Migration also
is influenced by atrocities such as war, torture and violence
(Boyle, 2014; Stokholm, 2015); and family and social reasons such
as marriage and relationships (Hayes and Al-Hamad, 1995;
Harbison, 1981; Fleischer, 2007). The major reasons cited by the
focus groups for Dalits to migrate to cities such as Pokhara from
towns and villages were: better economic opportunity, improved
security, better educational opportunities for themselves and chil-
dren and to avoid caste-based discrimination. The prospect for
commercialising traditional occupations such as tailoring, being a
minstrel, making utensils and jewellery was a pull factor contribut-
ing the reasons for migrating from rural villages to Pokhara city.
4.3. Shared economic experiences in identity construction
Historically, the traditional occupations such as tailor, musician,
blacksmith, goldsmith, tillage/ploughing and minstrels were exclu-
sively undertaken by Dalits under a baali ghare pratha (patron-
client relationship) as haruwa and charuwa (bonded labour) in
which they worked for higher caste landlords (zamindars) all year
round, but were paid during festivals and harvest times mostly in
kind, for example with grain. The Dalits were also remunerated in
kind during festivals such as Dashain and Tihar (Diwali), mostly
with meat and sweets. It was customary for Pariyar, Biswakarma
and minstrels to visit higher caste houses for collecting their pay-
ments. Usually, Pariyars were offered tails and Bishwokarmas were
given the neck of animals sacrificed in addition to food and sweets.
The minstrels were paid in grain whilst other Dalit castes such as
Nepali were not paid. A local proverb on some castes getting perks,
whilst others received nothing, was used in the villages:
‘‘. . .Damai lai puchhar, kami lai kado, bichar sarki lai hudana
khado. . . (tailors get tails, blacksmiths get the necks, poor Sarki
does not get anything but only non-remunerated work. . .)”
[Male, 57 years old]
Marxists, particularly those focusing on ‘‘economic determin-
ism”, argue that similarities and differences in economic structures
and mode of production forms the basis for the construction of
social and political identity (McMurtry, 1973; Harvey, 2010).
Whilst some obvious differences exist between class and castesuch as absence of caste-based discrimination, similar to class
caste also has a material function in acquisition and legitimisation
of power (Brubaker and Cooper, 2000). Nepalese political ideolo-
gists and leftist thinkers such as Ahuti (2008) argue that Dalits
have historically been denied access to land, arms and education.
A study on land acquisition by Dalits (Caplan, 1972) demonstrated
that control of both economic and political power by higher castes
prevented Dalit access to land. One of the participants of the focus
group discussion, who migrated to Pokhara from Lamjung said:
‘‘. . .We were cultivating this unproductive government land for
decades, it could not be irrigated and was not registered in our
names. . . we had small huts for our families. . . but those cun-
ning Brahmins/Chhetris registered the land in the local school’s
name and community forest, driving us away. . . They needed
grazing land for their cattle whilst we lost our livelihoods. . .”
[Male, 32 years old]
As Caplan (1972) argues, whilst Dalits have suffered caste-
based discrimination, exploitation and violence, and continue to
face obstacles in attaining full civil, political, economic, social
and cultural rights, the changing relations between them and
non-Dalits have meant that new economic and educational oppor-
tunities have arisen for Dalits, which is particularly relevant in the
context of urban settings. As such, in addition to social empower-
ment, the Dalits interviewed are also striving to capitalise on the
economic opportunities provided by the urban space compared
to their native villages, where they struggled to commercialise
their traditional occupations. As such, in addition to shared Dalit
identity, participants also created new identities, such as in busi-
ness and entrepreneurship. Many social theorists such as Tonkiss
(2006) and Merrifield (2002) argue that urban spaces provide dis-
tinctive and unique opportunities for harnessing individual poten-
tial and defining and redefining both individual and collective
identities. Many of the participants, who had suffered years of eco-
nomic exploitation in the villages, expressed a sense of not just
belongingness, but also a sense of gratitude towards the city for
the economic space provided. As one participant said:
‘‘. . .This city has given me a lot of things. . . It gave me my iden-
tity [as a businessman] and provided me with economic oppor-
tunity . . .. The city helped realise my dreams. . . and bore fruit
thanks to my hard work, dedication and work ethics. . .”
[Male 36 years old]
In addition to economic opportunities, cities such as Pokhara
also provide educational opportunities especially for children. For
example, one participant said:
‘‘. . .Education of my children is everything for me and my fam-
ily. My children attend a boarding school in Pokhara and I am
really pleased with their studies. This would not have been pos-
sible if we had not migrated to Pokhara. . . their cousins are still
in the village and not sure if they will pass their SLC as the
teaching in Government schools in the village is so poor. . .”
[Female 35 years old]
The newly developed relationship between the urban space of
Pokhara and increased opportunities is based on reciprocity with
both economic and social mutual benefits. Pokhara city provides
a new home away from home (village) to the migrant Dalits with
a greater sense of confidence in themselves socially, economically
and politically and lesser degree of caste-based discrimination, and
in turn they contribute towards the city environment, culture,
economy and commerce as one of the participants of focus group
discussion said:
‘‘. . .Pokhara is my new home. . . a new identity. . . I am making a
living here and raising my family. I am a Pariyar and I do
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also plays during the festivals and special official functions in
the sub-metropolitan council. . . many tourists come and watch
us. . . we are preserving our nation’s culture and traditions. . .”
[Male 42 years old]
The relationship of reciprocity between a city and its inhabi-
tants in fostering a collective sense of belonging and outcomes
has been discussed by Herrmann and Thöni (2009). A young entre-
preneur, who had migrated to Pokhara from neighbouring Lamjung
district, said:
‘‘. . .Whilst it’s true that this city (Pokhara) has provided me with
opportunities, the city also benefitted from my contributions. . .
because of the environment the city provided, I could provide
my service to other city residents and visitors through my busi-
ness. But definitely we need to look out for opportunities and
create opportunities for ourselves and others, the city alone
does not provide the environment. . . if you create opportunity
for yourself, other things will take care of themselves. . .”
[Male, 37 years]
It is important to mention that many respondents, both illiter-
ate and educated, considered that educational and entrepreneurial
skills were a prerequisite to survive in urban areas, as these pro-
vided opportunities for employment and income. It was also
observed that elderly people and women significantly lacked both
education and entrepreneurial skills and were not only less active
economically but also struggled to benefit from the economic
opportunities such as setting up businesses and getting paid
employment provided by the city. Many younger Dalits, despite
being well educated and entrepreneurial, preferred not to engage
in traditional occupations, even though these were in great
demand. Whilst some Gandharva commercialised their traditional
occupation by singing in restaurants and hotels, many Gandharvas
have left their traditional occupation altogether. Instead they pre-
ferred to open grocery stores, petty shops, tea shops and vegetable
shops. Some even worked as sweepers, taxi/tractor drivers and
municipal police officers (Parajuli, 2007).
This shift was partly because of stereotypes attached to tradi-
tional occupations such as tailoring, blacksmiths and minstrels,
despite existence of freedom and a real opportunity to make a
decent living from these occupations. This is mainly because those
occupations were historically associated with low castes, which
lacked respect in society. As one of the younger participants said:
‘‘. . .What is the point of going to college if I have to carry on my
father’s occupation. . .”
[Male, 20 years]
Participants, usually middle aged, who were either relatively
well off in their native villages or had gained wealth in the city,
were undertaking business ventures and commercialising their
traditional occupations. For example by opening small scale busi-
nesses such as tailor shops, jewellery shops, shoe shops and music
stores. It was also revealed by the participants that some occupa-
tions were more accommodating to women than others. For exam-
ple, some women from Pariyar castes were engaging in tailoring,
making ladies garments, whereas none of the women from Bish-
wokarma caste undertook work normally associated with black-
smiths, no women from Gandharva castes were street singers
and women belonging to Nepali (Sarki) caste were not involved
in their traditional occupations of repairing shoes.
Whilst cities and towns such as Pokhara have played a critical
role in providing economic, educational and social-cultural oppor-
tunities, migrating to cities was also considered economically
expensive and migrants often face difficulties in starting new
businesses.‘‘. . .OK there is money in the city, but we do not have the bait . . .
money attracts money. . .. We are not rich people, we do not
have land so banks will not provide us with loans to start busi-
nesses, and we just work in someone’s tailoring shop despite
our skills. . .”
[Male 35 years old]4.4. Power relationships in identity construction
Historically, Dalits have been formative in laying the foundation
for the democratic and ethnic movements, especially through
urban centred political action in Nepal (Bhattachan, 1998;
Lawoti, 2005). In order to maintain status, the more powerful
castes exercised non-competitive political rights. This was done
by rarely relinquishing political power to lower castes; maintain-
ing hegemony over resources of both governance (by controlling
bureaucracy) and natural resources (by denying access to land, for-
ests and water); and creating persistent structural inequalities. The
ethnic groups, including Dalits, were systematically excluded and
suffered institutional discrimination as they were denied civil,
political and economic rights (Lawoti, 2010). As Ahuti (2008)
argues ‘‘Dalits have been excluded from joining the military, own-
ing property and attending school” and historically they were
denied rights over their own wives; and relationships were not
allowed with non-Dalit women (Chakravarty, 1983, 1993).
One of the participants recalled that it was particularly hard for
him to attend school with Brahmins and Chhetri as firstly he was
ridiculed for being at school; and secondly excluded from social
functions, made to sit in a corner and bullied. His experience on
one occasion changed his life for ever:
‘‘. . .There was this Brahmin guy, who has gone onto become a
high school teacher, bullied me all the time for coming to
school. . . once he put some local tobacco leaves on my pocket
and asked the Guru to check everybody’s pocket. . . the physical
pain I suffered from the beating by the Guru on discovering
tobacco leaves on my pocket and emotional and psychological
trauma from the derogatory phrases he used against me and
Dalits generally still rings in my ears, I never smoked nor drank
. . .”
[Male, 55 years old]
Because of lack of education and access to productive resources,
such as land, Dalits often lived under economic hardship and
depended on higher castes for survival. This formed the basis for
their economic, social and political exploitation and discrimina-
tion. The contemporary Dalit movement seeks an end to all forms
of caste-based discrimination, including untouchability, develop
self-determination, ethnic and cultural identity and have propor-
tional representation in the state apparatus both in national poli-
tics and bureaucracy. This agenda was also mentioned by the
participants:
‘‘. . .Whilst we have roles and responsibilities towards our coun-
try, we have been arguing for a respectable and proportional
representation in affairs of state governance. . . we are not
Dalit. . .we were made Dalit. . . I think history has shown we
can contribute a lot to this country. . .”
[Male 42 years old]
Furthermore whilst the participants had varied political beliefs
and party affiliations, they were in agreement that Dalits have
played an important role in bringing about political transition in
Nepal. They expressed a sense of pride in the Maoist movement
for raising the voice of Dalits and ethnic minorities in Nepal. One
participant said:
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the Dalits and raised aspirations. . .it encouraged us to fight for
our rights, search for our history and identity. . . on many occa-
sions we were both the designers and implementer of warfare,
taking leadership roles within the Maoist movement. . . the
party gave us the chance and we performed. . . we just need to
fight for our rightful place in the society and polity. . .”
[Male, 35 years old]Kisan (2009) expressed similar sentiments: ‘‘the eradication of
caste-based discrimination and untouchability will be addressed
with proportionate representation and special/compensatory
rights in every level and structure of the state, horizontal and ver-
tical” (p.6). Given the fact that Nepal is undergoing unprecedented
political transformation including restructuring of state gover-
nance, proportional political representation and implementation
of affirmative policies, such as reservation in public sector employ-
ment,, such claims are not unique to Dalit identity and movement.
Indigenous Tharu communities (Sapkota, 2014), ethnic Janajati
(Bhattachan, 2003) and the Terai-based Madhesi communities
(Hachhethu, 2007) are also seeking fair representation and oppor-
tunity. As Gurung (1999) argues, ‘‘ethnic movements in Nepal are a
natural outcome of age old suppression through the imposition of a
stratified hierarchical model by the Hindu rulers of Nepal, which
needs to be removed with a view to making the hitherto deprived
ethnic groups equal partners in the development of a single terri-
torial Nepalese nation-state” (p. 81). The participants indicated
that a strong sense of collective identity and belonging has engen-
dered national feelings, and is also justifying claims for the rightful
place for Dalits in Nepal.
4.5. Challenges to Dalit identity
Despite residing in an urban location and being socially and
economically better off compared to Dalits in many rural areas in
Nepal identity formation amongst the Dalits of Pokhara takes place
at multiple levels and scales. Also, despite suffering common caste-
based discrimination like Dalits in other parts of Nepal, Dalits liv-
ing in Pokhara are a heterogeneous group partly because of they
do not necessarily share a distinct race, language, culture or terri-
tory and practice intra-Dalit caste-based discrimination. They offi-
cially belong to single social category and urban dwellers, but are
divided by numerous characteristics including religion, caste,
gender, language, region, rurality/urbanity and class position and
professional sector (Dahal et al., 2002).
Whilst the state has a standard definition of Dalits as those who
suffered social and cultural oppression, the word ‘‘Dalit” was per-
ceived differently by different members of the Dalit community.
Some members supported the use of the word, whilst others con-
sidered it to be patronising and derogatory and considered that it
should not be used to indicate oppressed ethnic groups. Advocates
of the use of Dalit firstly argue that the word Dalit is a symbol of
pride of common heritage uniting different ethnic groups who
have historically suffered oppression in Nepal. Secondly, they
argue that the word can bring different oppressed groups under
one umbrella, thereby creating unity in diversity. Opponents of
the use of the word Dalit argue that whilst they appreciate the
shared history of oppression and recognise the benefits of a united
voice, the word Dalit is degrading and contributes to continuation
and reinforcement of boundaries of oppression (Cameron, 2007).
Some participants questioned the current understanding of Dalits
and argued that if oppression is the main criteria, then other castes
also fall within the definition of being Dalit, as oppression does not
always follow caste lines. As one participant said:‘‘. . .Because the meaning of the word Dalit is individuals or
groups that have been oppressed or suppressed and it can be
anybody irrespective of castes, gender, income status, religion
and regional location. If some people from so called high castes
have suffered oppression or suppression socially or otherwise,
they should also be within the Dalit category so that the word
Dalit does not only imply people belonging to so called low
castes. . .”
[Male, 32 years old]
Many participants agreed that the word Dalit is a political term,
and has a political connotation attached, which has been used to
fulfil political ambitions of some Dalit leaders and many non-
Dalit leaders. Despite residing in a modern urban city such as
Pokhara, the participants expressed a high degree of anxiety about
the word Dalit increasingly getting institutionalised with long-
term implications on their identity. As one participant said:
‘‘. . .By labelling us Dalits, the state is subtly oppressing us as it
symbolises that our status is always considered inferior. Dalit
should not refer to an individual community. . .”
[Male 33 years old]
Another participant echoed similar sentiments:
‘‘. . .By institutionalising the word Dalit, the state has tagged us
in a way, where we always remain Dalits and oppressed. The
oppressed might get opportunities but the shackle will always
be there and will never go. . .it is still going to be a rubberstamp
on our foreheads. . .”
[Female, 23 years old]
The interview data also indicated that there is a tension
between individual identity and collective identity amongst the
Dalits in Pokhara. Participants, particularly those who were more
educated, increasingly questioned the very notion of caste as an
identity per se. There was a clear conflict and tension between
individual identity, as a professional citizen, and collective identity
as a member of the Dalit community, particularly amongst those
participants who were born and raised in the city and went to
boarding school.
‘‘. . .I think, the Dalits should not self-breed an inferiority com-
plex and underestimate our own potentials and complain as
one oppressed and discriminated group. The main thing is to
get educated and learn from society/community and get organ-
ised to create our own identity, not as one that is oppressed, but
one that is forward thinking and looking into the future. . .”
[Male 36 years old]
They argued that the notion of ethnicity amongst the Dalits is
fluid and should not refer to a particular community as it fails to
accommodate differences within the group. For example, Dalits
follow different religions such as Hinduism, Buddhism, Christianity
and Islam, and have differences in language, colour and experience
of varying degrees of caste-based discrimination. Instead, caste is
more psychological than social as it originates from a particular
‘‘state of mind”, which is inclined towards inflicting oppression
on others. As such, it should refer to an individual’s attributes
and to those who are inflicting social, economic, political and reli-
gious oppression on others. These can be individuals from any
background.
Whilst the participants generally agreed that the city environ-
ment provided more opportunities, their sense of social justice,
in terms of at least not having to face based-discrimination in soci-
ety, was mixed. Despite less social discrimination in the city com-
pared to their home villages, Dalits had to disguise their identity on
many occasions and negotiate their rights in the city differently,
often in a ways that were not from choice but from compulsion.
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ambivalent identity as a coping mechanism against caste-based
discrimination and to increase employment opportunity. The
process of identity formation was through both de-Digitisation
and re-Dalitisation, depending upon the circumstances in which
individuals had to conduct themselves.
4.5.1. De-Dalitisation
In small rural villages Dalits are highly visible as everybody
knows everybody, so it is virtually impossible for them to act
strategically to distance themselves from their caste, which is
ascribed by default at birth and is fixed and unchangeable. It
was also difficult for them to change their occupation because
of limited employment opportunities in rural areas and they
often depend on higher caste non-Dalits for their livelihoods.
However, the bigger space and dynamic nature of the city
facilitates more individualistic behaviour providing flexibility to
redefine identity. In some circumstances, redefining identity
was not a choice but a necessity to avoid discrimination. Many
participants (almost 70%) had changed their surnames and used
their sub-castes as a way of hiding their caste by masking or
altering them, which Folmar (2007) referred to as the ‘‘Politics
of Anonymity” (p. 45).
There were three ways the respondents pursued to de-Dalitise
themselves. Firstly, by blatantly lying about their caste, which
was mostly done in order to secure rented rooms and houses in
the city, as the participants had experienced hardship in finding
accommodation because of their caste. In particular, Dalit students
who were studying in schools and colleges reported to have strug-
gled to rent flats and rooms in the city as non-Dalits are hesitant to
rent out rooms to Dalits (B.K., 2007). They often had to seek accom-
modation in other Dalit households, which were in short supply as
few Dalits had a house of their own in the city. One of the partic-
ipants, who moved to Pokhara from the neighbouring Baglung dis-
trict to attend college, shared his experience of trying to rent a
room:
‘‘. . .I was desperate for accommodation and looking everywhere
to live. I deposited an advance after viewing the flat . . . the land-
lord liked that I was a student and could help his children with
their coursework sometimes. . . upon discovering that I was a
Dalit, I was denied the flat and he returned the deposit. . .”
[Male 25 years old]
Some respondents used their Dalit sub-caste (Gotra) to hide
their Dalit identity. For example, there are more than 126 Gotras
within the Pariyar caste. Gotra surnames can be similar to those
commonly used by higher castes such as Adhikari and Gautam
for Pariyar; Ghimire for Bishwokarma and Dawadi and Koirala for
Nepali (Sarki). The use of Gotra thus provides relative anonymity in
urban areas where migrants are not known personally by other
people, compared to their native towns and villages where almost
everyone knows everyone else. The use of Gotra has advantages
over blatantly lying about their own caste, which they considered
as a loss of their souls. The use of such surnames provided more
confidence to introduce themselves and interact with others who
are less likely to be aware of their real castes.
‘‘. . .Koirala jaat bhane pachhi kurai sakiyo, budho le chhori dela
bhanne dar (When I mention Koirala is my caste that’s the end
of the story, it’s quite scary though. . . thought the old man
might give me his daughter. . .)”
[Male, 28 years old]
Similar voiced were echoed by even those respondents who
were talented and educated as they were rejected relationship
with non-Dalit as one respondent said:‘‘. . . I really fancied this Brahmin girl at college. . . she was great
and I was not too bad either. . . we laughed together. . . it was
great. . . but when I proposed her on a fine sunny afternoon, I
still remember the day and time . . . it was 4.15 p.m. on 6th
December 2002 she said . . . maile bhannu parda ta no nai ho. . .
pachhi samasya huna sakchha kina bhane hamro jaat mildaina (I
will have to say no to your proposal as there might be problems
in the future as we come belong to different castes). . .”
[Male 31 years old]
Their experience was that if their caste sounded more like Brah-
min/Chhetri other people did not question them too much and life
became less complicated, at least in terms of not having to justify
one’s caste again and face discrimination. Nonetheless, whilst
some participants might feel more comfortable using these
Gotra-based names instead of their original caste names, some-
times they are asked ‘‘which caste is it?” This makes them feel
awkward and some of them reported to have struggled to react
to such situations when asked to establish if they are Brahmins
or Dalits. One respondent shared his annoyance:
‘‘. . .I hate f⁄⁄⁄⁄⁄⁄ caste. . . my caste is Tamata and it’s a caste, It’s
not a b⁄⁄⁄⁄⁄ tamatar (local word for tomato), is it?. . .”
[Male, 27 years old]
However, whilst use of the Gotra as opposed to surnames to dis-
guise one’s caste was commonly reported, some participants were
also frustrated with the treatment they received from officials
(usually high caste individuals) when preparing documents such
as citizenship certificates. Usually but not always, officials men-
tioned their actual castes in brackets making reference to Dalit sta-
tus. One of the participants showed his card and said:
‘‘. . .Look what he wrote. . . {Ran Bahadur Adhikari (Damai) . . .–
name changed} . . . why did he have to mention Damai. . . Look
his name is Indra Prasad Adhikari (name changed). . . he did
not write Brahmin in brackets. . .”
[Male 34 years old]4.5.2. Re-Dalitisation
The practice of alternating surnames (at least officially) did pro-
vide the participants some temporary breathing space for over-
coming caste-based discrimination. However, such strategies
neither change their caste affiliation nor help to reduce their long
term vulnerability to caste-based discrimination, mainly because
at one point people will ultimately find out the real caste affiliation
of Dalits despite using sub-castes as their surnames. Therefore,
they also face the same level of caste-based discrimination with
other Dalits who are not using such sub-castes as their surnames.
The government of Nepal has adopted affirmative action, offering
quotas for many indigenous groups and Dalits in a range of aspects
of governance including scholarships and employment opportuni-
ties. Some participants who had changed their surnames based on
their Gotra reported that they wished they had not changed. When
applying for jobs they were sometimes refused because their name
did not match with the list of Dalit castes mentioned in the govern-
ment document.
‘‘. . .Last year I could not fill the forms for the medical entrance
test. . . the officer said my caste (Ghimire) which I changed for
Bishwokarma a few years back is not a Dalit caste. . . it was
too late for the official verification. . . you know how things
work at the government offices. . .”
[Male, 22 years old]
Participants opined that affirmative action and reservation poli-
cies were a positive development for improving educational and
economic opportunities for previously marginalised communities
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they would not change their official surnames based on Gotra to
original ones as they were required to get their documents ver-
ified by government officials that the sub-caste they used in offi-
cial documents such as education certificates, citizenship card
and passport, is in fact a Dalit caste. They argued that govern-
ment facilities such as scholarships and quotas for employment,
which are designed as a part of wider affirmative policies, should
be accessible to everyone without having to prove one’s
Dalitness.
‘‘. . .Now we are having to prove our caste as Dalit. . . previously
being labelled as Dalit was a trouble. . . now not being Dalit is a
trouble. . . when will they leave us alone. . .”
[Female, 35 years old]
The practice of anonymising Dalit identity through the use of
Gotra and changing their surnames to sound like higher castes is
considered to be a shameful act of not valuing one’s identity; and
attempting to re-Dalitise to obtain state benefits allocated for Dal-
its who take pride in their identity is selfish. As one of the partic-
ipants in the focus group discussion argued:
‘‘. . .Those are selfish individuals and do not uphold the Dalit
ideology. . .Tak Pare Tiwari natra Gotame (if opportunity arises
they are Tiwari - a high caste otherwise they are Gotame - a
Dalit caste. . . they are selfish. . .”
[Female 19 years]
However, in order to avoid bureaucratic hassles, many partici-
pants who had previously switched their surnames based on their
Gotra either changed or were thinking about changing it back to
their original surnames.
The National Dalit Commission of Nepal (NDC-Nepal) has
identified about 26 castes of which 7 are Hill Dalits (of which
two belonged to the Newar community) and the remaining 19
Madhesi Dalits (NDC, 2014). Whilst all Dalit castes have suffered
various forms of caste-based discrimination, the problems associ-
ated with these communities are not the same. This is partly
because of different geographic locations, cultural practices, rites
and rituals, and languages. Although untouchability has been the
common suffering of all Dalits, their experience of social exclu-
sion was varied, with Dalits in the Terai on the southern plains
bordering India, facing more disadvantages than Dalits in the
Hills. The problems encountered by Terai Dalits included land-
lessness, lack of citizenship, illiteracy, poverty, child marriage,
dowry system, social boycott by non-Dalits and Sinopratha, a tra-
ditional practice of eating carcasses, mainly of goats, cows, oxen
and buffaloes (NDC, 2014).
Similarly, Dalit sub-castes such as Pode and Chyame, despite
being defined as Hill Dalits, have a language and cultural practices
similar to the ethnic Newars of Kathmandu, who are Janajati. Some
Newar castes disapproved of the use of the term Dalit to refer to
them, as they consider their identity is different to other Dalits in
Nepal. Furthermore, there is also rampant caste-based discrimina-
tion within the Dalit communities in Nepal, as some Dalit castes
consider themselves to be superior to others, creating the ‘‘strictest
caste exclusivity” (Weber, 1972). Earlier studies in India
(Mandelbaum, 1970) demonstrated that caste hierarchy amongst
the Dalit community is entrenched so that the ‘‘untouchables have
their own untouchables” (p. 298). A critical reflection of intra-Dalit
caste-based discrimination was also shared by one of the partici-
pants, as he put it:
‘‘. . .We call for a united alliance against the oppressors. How
you can have unity when we have so much division among our-
selves? May be we should clean up our own mess first. . .”
[Male, 31 years]Another effect of urbanisation was that the price of land in
urban Pokhara rose dramatically (Rimal, 2013), which acted as an
incentive to relocate for Dalit castes such as Pode and Chayme
who lived in the centre of Pokhara city. The Podes migrated to
the neighbouring Begnas area from Pode tole of Pokhara after sell-
ing their land at a higher price to migrants from the neighbouring
hills. They are collectively called Jalaris (fishermen) but had aban-
doned fishing and where working with the Pokhara municipality as
cleaners. A similar observation was reported in an earlier study by
Chhetri (2007). The Jalaris or Podes considered themselves to be of
higher status compared to other Dalit castes, as they are descended
from the Newar community of Kathmandu. One of the participants
mentioned that their ‘‘natural caste” is Newar, not Dalit, and were
frustrated at being labelled a Dalit, and said in a distinctively New-
ari tone:
‘‘. . .Aba Mha: Pooja garchhekai chha (we observe Newari festival
Mha Pooja). . . Newari nai bolchha (We speak Newari). . . tai pani
Dalit bhanchha (still we are called Dalit). . ., Bujhnai sakdaina
hami ta (We cannot understand this). . .”
[Male, 45 years old]
Dalit communities not only have cultural heterogeneities, but
also practice caste-based discrimination, including untouchability,
amongst themselves. The endemic nature of such practices was
argued rather cynically by a participant:
‘‘. . .We need to clear up our own mess first. . . until we do some-
thing to eradicate intra-Dalit caste system, we will never over-
come suppression from higher castes. . .”
[Male, 26 years old]
Such divisions and disunity, and worse still the practice of
untouchability and other forms of caste-based discrimination,
within Dalit communities has further complicated the process of
creating a unified Dalit identity (Pariyar, 2013). The existence of
intra-Dalit caste-based discrimination has created factionalism
within Dalits, which provided opportunities for higher castes
exploiters to obscure the common interests of those whose labour
they live off, and it will persist as long as an exploiting class exists
to wield it for this purpose (Bhattarai, 2003). As such, Dalits had lit-
tle chance of making economic progress and bringing social trans-
formation to the villages. Liberation from the village hegemony is a
key reason for migrating to urban centres such as Pokhara
5. Conclusions
Whilst political debates have centred on the capital Kathmandu,
a significant proportion of Nepal’s population lives in villages,
small cities and towns. As such, cities like Pokhara have played,
and will continue to play, a major role in the lives of many individ-
uals and communities, both politically and economically. Dalits in
Nepal have suffered historical disadvantages economically. By
moving from rural villages to cities they are able to commercialise
their traditional occupations, advance educationally and become
involved in raising political awareness. However, caste still
remains a strong factor in their ‘‘adopted home”. In Pokhara
caste-based discrimination has continued in the city, although it
is less pronounced compared to that in villages. The focus groups
reveal that Dalits have used multiple methods as ‘‘coping strate-
gies” and through de-Dalitisation and the ‘‘politics of anonymity”
have benefited in the short term. However, these strategies have
become counterproductive in the long term. Efforts to de-Dalitise
oneself for individual identity have added complications in affir-
mative programmes, and are likely to have long-term implications
for collective identity and weaken bargaining positions in the
ongoing state restructuring process. Furthermore, there are
B. Pariyar, J.C. Lovett / Geoforum 75 (2016) 134–147 145significant outstanding historical differences amongst the Dalits,
and this is part of intra-Dalit caste-based discrimination. However,
it is worth noting that because of historical subordination and rel-
atively new awareness, the concept of ‘Dalit’ still remains a modern
identity that is in the process of construction. Therefore, Dalits as
an identity not only competes with older identities that assimilate
the collective experience, but also those who are avoiding Dalit
identity altogether make their collective agenda difficult to pursue
during current political transitions to new constitution, state
restructuring and long- term peace and development.
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